Saudi deal includes enrichment study

The U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement contains a two-year study on uranium enrichment feasibility, despite Trump claiming there will be no enrichment. Enrichment technology can produce reactor fuel or nuclear bomb material.

“But anyone reading the agreement would be surprised to learn that it includes a two-year study on the feasibility of uranium enrichment in the kingdom”

Missing key international safeguards

The deal does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the Additional Protocol, which provides enhanced international inspections to detect covert nuclear activities.

Saudi Arabia threatened nuclear weapons

Saudi officials have previously threatened to obtain nuclear weapons if Iran does, making these safeguard gaps particularly concerning given regional tensions.

Administration frames deal as business opportunity

Trump officials downplay proliferation risks and present the agreement as a multibillion-dollar opportunity for U.S. nuclear companies, claiming U.S. control prevents weapons development.

Black box facility claims lack legal teeth

The administration claims enrichment would occur only in a U.S.-built, owned, and operated black box facility, but these commitments appear only in private side letters, not in the agreement itself.

Exclusivity claims lack clear language

The agreement expresses intent for Saudi Arabia to work with the U.S. but stops short of requiring that only the U.S. and its designees can be partners, leaving wiggle room for Saudi enrichment elsewhere.

U.S. reactor industry faces challenges

Westinghouse's AP1000 reactors, the likely choice for Saudi Arabia, arrived late and billions over budget in China and the U.S., pushing the company toward bankruptcy.

Delays could pressure enrichment concessions

If reactor construction in Saudi Arabia runs late and over budget, Riyadh could leverage delays to demand greater latitude on enrichment or threaten to take business to other suppliers.

U.S. holds power to approve enrichment

The same agreement text that gives Washington power to say no to enrichment also gives it power to say yes, creating risk that Trump's transactional approach could override nonproliferation concerns.

Trump signals willingness for South Korea enrichment

Trump has already indicated openness to allowing South Korea uranium enrichment for nuclear submarines in exchange for U.S. shipbuilding investments, suggesting similar deals with Saudi Arabia are possible.

Friendly proliferation consensus eroding

Decades-long U.S. opposition to nuclear weapons for friendly nations is weakening, with some arguing nuclear-armed allies help deter Russia, China, and North Korea.

Global nonproliferation norms deteriorating

Great powers increasingly make exceptions to nonproliferation rules for allies in geopolitical competition, with Russia and China potentially offering similar deals to their partners.

Congress must address Iran threat too

Washington must simultaneously contain Iran's nuclear program and maintain security commitments to Saudi Arabia, as the crown prince has said Iranian weapons could trigger Saudi weaponization.

Congress should add strict oversight

Congress should require annual intelligence assessments of Saudi nuclear intentions, rapid notification of any deviations from commitments, and prohibit enrichment facilities unless Saudi Arabia accepts the Additional Protocol.