The biological war scenario that keeps experts awake

Author Annie Jacobsen explores why engineered pathogens pose a greater extinction threat than nuclear weapons.

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Sep 25, 2026

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The biological war scenario that keeps experts awake

Author Annie Jacobsen explores why engineered pathogens pose a greater extinction threat than nuclear weapons.

In brief

Author Annie Jacobsen explores why engineered pathogens pose a greater extinction threat than nuclear weapons. Biological weapons are more dangerous than nuclear ones because the barrier to entry is far lower: while nuclear weapons require state resources, pathogens can be accessed and modified by almost anyone with…

AI chatbots face bioweapon queries

An open silver laptop against a solid orange background displays a pixelated yellow warning triangle containing a black biohazard symbol.

Anthropic reported five cases where foreign scientists tried to bypass Claude's safeguards on gain-of-function research, the practice of enhancing pathogens to make them more infectious or deadly.

The dual-use dilemma

Genetic engineering knowledge can help develop vaccines and drugs, but the same information enables weaponization. This tension defines the gain-of-function debate.

Meet Annie Jacobsen

The bestselling author of Nuclear War: A Scenario just released Biological War: A Scenario, drawing on decades of national security reporting and access to military and government officials.

Biological weapons rank second

Biological weapons rank second

A Pentagon document lists biological weapons as nearly as destructive as nuclear weapons, but far more likely to be used because the threshold for entry is extremely low.

Nuclear weapons need states

Creating a nuclear weapon requires weapons-grade fissile material, ICBMs, bombers, and submarines. Only nation states can realistically build them.

“You've got to be a state!”

Pathogens are everywhere

While nine nuclear-armed states control nuclear arsenals, most of the world has access to potential pandemic agents, making biological weapons far more accessible.

Accidents more likely than attacks

Intelligence agencies actively disrupt bioweapons programs, but 3,600 biosafety labs worldwide conduct gain-of-function research. Accidental release is statistically far more probable than deliberate deployment.

“Think about all the people, scientists, nation states, academic institutions, that are manipulating pathogens for greater virulence.”

Lab accidents have happened

A researcher can stick themselves with a syringe and go into denial, heading home infected. Soviet scientist Nikolai Ustinov infected himself with Marburg virus and died in isolation.

Post-9/11 research acceleration

After the 2001 anthrax attacks, the riskiest gain-of-function research accelerated, including experiments making flu airborne and creating mousepox variants that evade immunity.

Scientists defend publication

Some researchers argue that publishing deadly pathogen sequences is necessary, comparing it to not stopping knife or airplane production because they can be weaponized.

Jacobsen chose plague for her scenario

She selected a weaponized Yersinia pestis strain because plague represents the dual nature of science: antibiotics once cured it, but genetic engineering could render them useless.

“I chose plague because it seems to be this dark metaphor for the two different uses of science and technology, one for good and one for bad.”

Pneumonic plague kills everyone

Airborne plague has a 100 percent fatality rate, matching only rabies. Only two diseases on Earth are that lethal.

The Soviet super-plague program

Thirty to forty years ago, the Soviet Union built a genetically engineered plague weapon designed to kill all people while leaving infrastructure intact, according to defector scientists.

Russia likely still has programs

The State Department says the illegal Soviet-era bioweapons program was absorbed into Russia's current program, which is deeply disturbing given the sophistication of the original work.

No real defense exists

A retired Air Force colonel who ran Pentagon war games told Jacobsen there is no real defense against large-scale biological attack, only mitigation to reduce extinction.

“There is no real defense against a large-scale biological attack, only things you can do to mitigate extermination.”

Devolution plan activates

If catastrophic biological attack causes anarchy, the president can declare the Insurrection Act and trigger Devolution, moving predetermined government officials to classified bunkers to reconstitute government.

AI-enabled bio threats exploding

Jacobsen didn't include AI in her book but notes in acknowledgments the terrifying concept of mirror life, where AI could help extinguish all humans. The Fort Detrick lab director said she spoke the quiet part out loud.

Purpose is pressure, not panic

Jacobsen writes that her books aim to create pressure for change, not panic. Readers report feeling less terrified after understanding real threats versus hypothetical existential fears.

At a glance

Biological weapons are more dangerous than nuclear ones because the barrier to entry is far lower: while nuclear weapons require state resources, pathogens can be accessed and modified by almost anyone with lab access.

Read the original on Mother Jones

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